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ABSTRACT 
 
Does the uptick rule inflate stock prices? Miller (1977) hypothesizes that short sale constraints 
lead to stock overvaluation.  In this paper I test this hypothesis in a power setting in which the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended the uptick rule for a pre-chosen set of stocks 
(pilot stocks) in 2005.  The results suggest that on the NYSE the suspension of the uptick rule 
mitigates stock overvaluation and brings stock prices closer to their fundamental values.  On the 
NASDAQ, however, lifting the uptick rule goes beyond correcting stock overvaluation; it leads to 
stock undervaluation. The results are robust after controlling for other factors, such as firm size, 
book-to-market ratio, stock return momentum, and availability of exchange-traded-options.  
 
Keywords:  The Uptick Rule; Short Sales; Stock Returns; Stock Overvaluation 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 short sale is the sale of a security by an investor who does not own it. Short sellers were blamed for 
the stock market crash of 1929.  During the 1930s, the lawmakers in the U.S. introduced the uptick 
rule, which prohibit short sales on the down-tick basis, to prevent short sellers from manipulating 
stock prices downward
1
. Miller (1977) hypothesizes that short sale constraints prevent pessimists from registering 
negative information and opinions in stock prices, resulting in overvaluation and low future returns.  However, 
Miller’s hypothesis does not explain why rational investors would buy overpriced stocks (Jones and Lamont, 2002). 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that stocks may not be overpriced because the expected negative information 
may already be incorporated in stock prices even though the actual negative information are not when short sales are 
constrained. This assertion directly contradicts to Miller’s overvaluation hypothesis.  
 
Previous empirical studies have not generated convincing evidence on Miller’s overpricing hypothesis. For 
example, Boehme, et al. (2006) show that the most short-sale constrained, high-dispersion stocks earn annualized 
abnormal returns of -14.8% to -20.7%,  suggesting stocks subject to both short sale constraints and investors’ 
disagreement are likely to be overvalued. In contrast, Doukas, et al. (2006) adopt an alternative proxy for investors’ 
opinion dispersion and find that Boehme et al. (2006)’s results are not systematically significant. Previous studies 
have employed various measures for short sale constraints; such as monthly short interests (Dechow, et al., 2001; 
and Desai, et al., 2002), share lending costs and share lending supply ( D’Avolio, 2002; Jones and Lamont, 2002; 
Ofek and Richardson, 2003; and Nagel, 2005), institutional ownership (Chen, et al., 2002; Asquith, et al., 2005), 
availability of exchange traded options (Danielson and Sorescu, 2001), and legal threats on short selling (Lamont, 
2004).  But each of these short sale constraints measures has limitations. For example, using of monthly short 
interest, one cannot distinguish short selling demand from short selling supply, therefore may either overestimate or 
underestimate the magnitude of stock overvaluation (Cohen, et al., 2007; Chen, et al., 2002). Institutional ownership 
as a proxy for short sale constraint has endogeneity problem, because institutional investors may have capability to 
identify stocks with high future stock returns.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Rule 10a-1 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that an exchange-traded security may not be sold short at a price that is 
either lower or equal to the last trading price. This is so called the uptick rule on the NYSE. The National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) introduced in 1994 a bid-test for NASDAQ listed stocks, the NASD Rule 3350, which provides that 
when the bid is a downtick from the previous bid, short sellers other than market dealers cannot short at prices lower than one 
penny above the bid. I refer to these short sale price test rules as the uptick rule in this paper.  
A 
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The period surrounding the introduction of the pilot program in 2005 offers a powerful empirical setting for 
examining whether short sale constraints lead to stock overpricing
2
. Adopting the uptick rule as the short sale 
constraints has several advantages. First, the suspension status of the uptick rule during the pilot program provides 
us with a setting that clearly separates short sale constrained stocks (control stocks) from less short sale constrained 
stocks(pilot stocks).  Second, a firm-size and book-to-market ratio matched sample of control stocks that are subject 
to the price test and are trading in a common market environment during the same time period is available.  Third, 
the uptick rule as a proxy of short sale constraints is free of the endogeneity concern.  The SEC chose pilot stocks 
from the Russell 3000 membership list by ranking on average daily dollar trading volume for the previous year and 
then selecting every third stock as a pilot stock; the remaining stocks in the Russell 3000 are control stocks. This 
process should have eliminated any systematic difference between pilot and control stocks and avoided any 
endogeneity problem. For these reasons, the pilot program that suspended the uptick rule for pilot stocks in 2005 
represents one of the most powerful settings available to date for testing Miller’s overpricing hypothesis.  
 
Using the Regulation SHO short selling data from 2005, I examine the impact of the suspension of the 
uptick rule on stocks returns. Comparing pilot and control stocks listed on the NYSE during the sample period from 
May to December 2005, I show that the suspension of the uptick rule on the NYSE mitigates stock overvaluation as 
much as 3% of the stock value over a one year period. This result is consistent with the notion that stock 
overvaluation is associated with the presence of investor opinion dispersion and short sale constraints. The 
overvaluation reduction effect varies depending on the types of stocks; it is mostly driven by stocks with no options, 
small stocks, and value stocks. For stocks with exchange-traded-options, it appears that the suspension of uptick 
rules cannot effectively help to reduce stock overvaluation since overvaluation in those stocks has already been 
mitigated by the introduction of options. This is consistent with Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) and highlights the 
role of stock option as an alternative of short selling vehicle in reducing stock overvaluation. 
 
On the NASDAQ, however, the results show that lifting the uptick rule goes beyond correcting stock 
overvaluation. The prices of high-dispersion stocks tend to be distressed relative to low-dispersion stocks. When the 
uptick rule on the NASDAQ is suspended for pilot stocks, investors who hold the most pessimistic opinions can 
aggressively submit downtick short sale orders, pushing stock prices down to a level that may be lower than the true 
stock value. Further, the suspension of the uptick rule on the NASDAQ makes it easier for ‘predatory’ short sellers 
to aggressively submit short orders and manipulate stock price downwards. Therefore, the results here suggest that 
the SEC’s recent decision to permanently remove the uptick rule in July 2007 may not be considered as an optimal 
policy, if such undervaluation is driven by “predatory” short sellers’ price manipulation3.  
 
This paper contributes to the ongoing research by investigating whether stock prices tend to be less 
overvalued when a certain short sale constraint is relaxed, using a study design that complements prior studies. First, 
I use Regulation SHO daily short selling data from 2005 that clearly separates stocks with short sale constraints 
(control stocks) from stocks with lower short sale constraints (pilot stocks). Using this method, I examine the impact 
of the removal of the uptick rule on stock returns. The suspension status of the uptick rule, based on the SEC’s 
recently adopted Regulation SHO, provides us with a proxy for short sale constraints that is easy to identify and is 
not subject to an endogeneity criticism.  Second, the use of high frequency short sale data in this paper improves 
upon the calendar time portfolio approach in the literature. Previous literature that uses monthly short interest as a 
proxy for short sale constraints is unable to capture the daily variation of short selling activities, overlooking the 
impact of short selling on short-term stock returns. Using daily short selling data facilitates the examination of the 
impact of relaxing a short sale constraint on stock returns and allows me to further explore the time dynamics of 
how the market corrects stock overvaluation.  
 
 
                                                 
2 To facilitate the SEC and academics to study the effect of the uptick rule on market quality and trading processes, the SEC 
implemented a pilot program beginning on May 2, 2005 which suspended uptick rule restrictions for a set of pre-chosen “pilot 
stocks”. The pilot program established by the Regulation SHO enables comparison between pilot and control stocks, thus 
providing us with a natural experiment to study the effect of removing uptick rules on stock returns in a controlled environment.   
3 The SEC revoked the uptick rule for all exchanged listed securities in July 2007. Also see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) 
for details of “predatory short selling”.  
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Three recent studies are most closely related to this paper. Using Reg SHO short sale data during a 6-month 
period around the introduction of the Pilot program, Diether, et al. (2009) examine the effect of the uptick rule on a 
variety of market qualify measures, such as trading volume, liquidity, and volatility. They find that the suspension of 
the uptick rule on the NYSE is associated with significant increase in short selling activities, a large reduction in the 
asymmetries of depth and order flows, and a slight increase in short-term volatility. Their testing results are 
confirmed by Alexander and Peterson (2008), who use an 8-month Reg SHO data around the introduction of the 
Pilot program. Both studies suggest that the uptick rule should be removed permanently. The Economic Analysis 
Office of the SEC (2007) compares pilot and control stocks along several dimensions. They show that the 
suspension of the uptick rule is associated with increased short selling activity, more orders executed on downticks, 
a decrease in quote depth, higher intraday volatility for small stocks, and lower intraday volatility. They suggest that 
removing the uptick rule has not had a deleterious impact on market quality or liquidity. While these studies 
examine general market quality measures such as bid-ask spread, bid and ask depth, liquidity, and volatility, this 
paper adds to the current literature by focusing on the impact of the uptick rule on stock returns.  
 
Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. First, the sample period is short. I use only twelve months 
of short selling data in the analysis and this restricts the generalizability of the conclusions to other periods. Second, 
I rely on the mean scaled standard deviation of sell-side brokerage firms’ earnings forecasts to measure the 
dispersion of investors’ opinions. This may not be a perfect proxy for opinion dispersion, because aggregated sell-
side brokers’ earnings forecasts may be upwardly biased due to interest conflicts. Also, investors may form different 
evaluations on stock prices even when they have the same earnings forecast information. Thirdly, the causality 
relationship between “predatory” short selling and the undervaluation of high-dispersion stocks on the NASDAQ 
has not been established in this paper. It is important to justify the assertion that removing the bid-price test rule on 
the NASDAQ was not an optimal policy for the SEC. Future research that examines the impact of removing uptick 
rules on “predatory” short selling would be a fruitful extension of this study. 
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
data and samples. Section 4 examines the impact of suspension of uptick rule on stock returns on both the NYSE 
and the NASDAQ. Several robustness tests are performed in Section 5. Section 6 provides conclusions. 
 
2.  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the role of the uptick rule in shaping cross sectional future stock returns.  
The null hypothesis takes Miller’s (1977) view that stock prices tend to be overvalued in the presence of short sale 
constraints and investor opinion dispersion. In this paper, I measure overvaluation in stocks as the return differential 
between low- and high- investor opinion dispersion portfolios ( low-and high-dispersion portfolio, hereafter), and 
examine the role of the uptick rule as a short sale constraint. When the uptick rule is in effect, a significant 
proportion of investors who hold the most negative opinions on a certain stock are prohibited from short selling at a 
desired price.  Reduced selling pressure on these stocks leads to an upwardly biased price and a subsequent low 
future return. When the uptick rule is suspended for pilot stocks, it would help short sellers to promptly register their 
negative opinions in stock prices on the down-ticks, thus mitigating the stock overvaluation. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis states that the return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios should be smaller for pilot 
stocks than for control stocks, and that the return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios should be 
positive for both pilot and control stocks. Specifically, the null hypothesis can be expressed as the following.  
 
0)31()31(:  pilotcontrolnull DDDDH                                                    (1) 
 
where D1 is the low-dispersion portfolio return and D3 is the high-dispersion portfolio return. The alternative 
hypothesis states that market prices will be unbiased and future returns will be independent of the uptick rule 
restriction. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model a rational market maker who sets bids and asks prices rationally. 
Even with heterogeneous expectation and short sale constraints, the equity price may be unbiased. Similarly, Hong 
and Stein (2000) introduce rational arbitrageurs who face no short sale constraints in a rational equilibrium model. 
The arbitrageurs observe the actions of overconfident investors with short sale constraints and formulate rational 
expected stock prices. Any upward biased stock price will be corrected by arbitrageurs. Thus, the alternative 
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hypothesis states that there is an ambiguous relation between the uptick rule and future stock returns, and the return 
differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios will not be smaller for pilot stocks than those for control 
stocks.  
 
0)31()31(:  pilotcontrolealternativ DDDDH                                            (2) 
 
3.  DATA AND SAMPLES 
 
To comply with the Regulation SHO, stock market dealers and brokers were required to report tick-by-tick 
short sales transactions to the SEC during the pilot program in 2005. The resulting data is Regulation SHO data. I 
obtain NYSE Regulation SHO data from NYSE TAQ dataset. The NASDAQ SHO data was provided by the NASD. 
Stock returns are from the Center for Research in Securities Price (CRSP) Daily Stocks Combined Files and firm 
Characteristic variable data are from the COMPUSTAT. The data on analysts’ earnings estimates are obtained from 
the Fist Call Historical Estimates. Option availability data was obtained from CBOE (Chicago Board of Option 
Exchange). Following Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) and Diether et al. (2002), I measured investors’ opinions 
dispersion as the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by the mean estimations. Data for analyst 
quarterly earnings forecasts are obtained from the First Call dataset. 
 
To facilitate the comparison between uptick rule unrestricted (pilot) stocks and the uptick rule restricted 
(control) stocks, I construct pilot and control samples for a post-SHO period from May to December 2005 for both 
NYSE- and NASDAQ-listed stocks
4
. The SEC chose pilot stocks from the Russell 3000 membership list by ranking 
on average daily dollar trading volume for the previous year and then selecting every third stock as a pilot stock; the 
remaining stocks in the Russell 3000 are control stocks. Russell 3000 membership lists are obtained from the 
Russell Company. I then obtain NYSE pilot stocks lists from the NYSE. On May 2, 2005, there were 486 NYSE-
listed pilot stocks. To eliminate the potential effect of index inclusion or index exclusion on stock returns, I require 
that sample stocks were members of the Russell 3000 index after the June 2004 reconstitution, and remained in the 
Russell 3000 member list after the June 2005 reconstitution. Thus, I exclude stocks that were added to the index due 
to IPOs during the period June 2004 through the end of 2005, as well as stocks that were eliminated during the same 
period due to mergers, bankruptcies, and ticker changes. Then the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases are checked 
to see if the stocks have positive book-to-market ratios. Stocks with negative book-to-market ratios are excluded 
from the analysis to reduce the effect of outliers. The resulting NYSE-pilot sample has 418 stocks. To construct the 
NYSE-control stock sample, I first include the Russell 3000 stocks that are listed on the NYSE. Then I exclude 
stocks that were added to or eliminated from the index. Excluding stocks on the pilot stock list as of May 2, 2005 
results in 937 NYSE-control stocks. Next, NYSE-control stocks are matched with NYSE-pilot stocks by year-end 
2004 market capitalization and year-end 2004 book-to-market ratios, resulting in 418 pairs of stocks in both NYSE- 
pilot and -control samples. Following the same procedure, I construct NASDAQ-pilot and –control samples 
consisting of 358 pair of stocks. 
 
The summary statistics based on various firm-specific characteristics for both the pilot and control samples 
during the post-SHO period from May to December 2005 are detailed in Table 1. Short sale ratio is defined as 
average daily shorting volume divided by the trading volume. Firm size is measured as the market capitalization of 
individual stocks, which equals to the product of shares outstanding and the daily closing price. Book value is equal 
to shareholders’ equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit, and minus book value of preferred stock. Daily 
share turnover is the ratio of daily trading volume to shares outstanding. Risk adjusted (beta excess)  returns are 
calculated as the excess return of a specific stock less the average return of all stocks in its beta portfolio based on 
previous year beta ranking.  
                                                 
4 Previous literature reveals that the impact of uptick rule suspension on market quality is different for NYSE-listed stocks and 
for NASDAQ-listed stocks. Diether, et al. (2006) and the Office of Economic Analysis of the SEC (2007) argue that the NYSE’s 
uptick rule is a more binding rule for short sellers. Furthermore, Diether, et al. (2006) argue that NASDAQ’s bid-test rule has a 
much more limited effect on the trading strategies of short sellers than the tick-test rule on the NYSE, because short sellers of 
NASDAQ-listed stocks can use a more natural mixture of aggressive marketable limited orders and passive limit orders to 
execute their short sales. Therefore, I perform separate analyses for NYSE-listed and NASDAQ-listed stock to accommodate 
different natures of uptick rule constraints on the NYSE and NASDAQ-listed stocks.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Summary for the Pilot and Control Samples 
during the post-SHO period from May to December 2005 
Panel A: NYSE-listed Stocks 
 Pilot Control (Pilot-Control) t-stat 
Short Sale Ratio 23.10% 20.94% 2.16% *** 5.83 
 (0.25%) (0.27%)   
Investor Opinion Dispersion 0.37 0.365 0.005 0.14 
 
(0.03) (0.021) 
  Firm Size ( in million dollars ) 7,968 8,074 -106 -0.08 
 (879) (910)   
Book-to-Market 0.558 0.569 -0.011 -0.38 
 (0.0175) (0.0226)   
Daily Share Turnover  0.70% 0.74% -0.04% -1.52 
 (0.02%) (0.02%)   
Daily Stock Return 0.08% 0.04% 0.04%*** 6.25 
 (0.01%) (0.00%)   
Risk Adjusted (Beta Excess) Daily Return -0.02% -0.01% -0.01% -1.49 
 (0.01%) (0.00%)   
# of Stocks with Options  46.14% 50.70% -4.57% n/a 
 
Panel B: NASDAQ-listed Stocks 
 Pilot Control (Pilot-Control) t-stat 
Short Selling Ratio 19.99% 18.60% 1.39%*** 7.63 
 (0.0015) (0.0010)   
Investor Opinion Dispersion 0.42 0.45 -0.03 -0.59 
 
(0.038) (0.033) 
  
Firm Size ( in million dollars ) 2,467 2,526 -59 -0.08 
 (485) (473)   
Book-to-Market 0.467 0.454 0.013 0.49 
 (0.0167) (0.0206)   
Daily Share Turnover  0.97% 0.95% 0.02% 0.42 
 (0.0004) (0.0003)   
Daily Stock Return 0.11% 0.12% -0.01% -0.48 
 (0.009%) (0.006%)   
Risk Adjusted (Beta Excess) Daily Return -0.03% -0.02% -0.01% -0.9 
 (0.009%) (0.006%)   
#of Stocks with Options  46% 43% 3% n/a 
Standard errors for mean estimates are in parentheses. The differentials between pilot and control stocks are shown as (pilot-
control), followed by the t-statistics. *** is significant at 1% level.  
 
Table 1 shows that during a period from May to December 2005 on the NYSE, the short sale ratio for pilot 
stocks (23%) is greater than that for control stocks (21%) by approximately two percentage points. Similarly, on the 
NASDAQ short sale ratio for pilot stocks is 1.4% greater than that for control stocks. These differences are 
statistically significant.  Table 1 also shows that during the post-SHO sample period, the pilot sample is well-
matched with the control sample on firm size, book to market ratio, daily share turnover, and investor opinion 
dispersion. Differences in these characteristics between two samples are not significantly different from zero. Panel 
A of Table 2 shows that the average daily raw return for the pilot sample is significantly greater than for the control 
sample. It seems that without the uptick rule restriction, pilot stocks tended to be less overvalued on the NYSE. 
However, factors other than the uptick rule suspension may have contributed to such return difference. To adjust for 
stock market systematic risk, I use the risk-adjusted (beta excess) returns to measure the return differences. To 
calculate the risk adjusted (beta excess) returns, I follow a two-step procedure. First, I run the following market 
model based on previous year stock returns data to calculate beta estimates for all available stocks in the CRSP 
dataset.  
 
itftmtiitftit RRRR   )( ;                                                          (3) 
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In the equation, itR  is stock returns, mtR is the market return, measured by value-weighted market return, and ftR  
is the risk free rate, measured by three-month Treasury bill rate. Then, I rank stocks into 10 deciles based on beta 
estimates. Finally, I calculate beta excess return as the difference between the stock daily returns and beta ranking 
portfolio returns for both pilot and control stocks. The results show that there is no statistically significant distinction 
between the pilot sample and the control sample. According to option availability information from the CBOE, 
about 50% of control stocks have options available while 46% of pilot stocks have options available. This slight 
difference in the option availability may also contribute to the return difference between pilot and control samples, 
making it necessary to control for the option availability in later analysis.  
 
4.  THE IMPACT OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE UPTICK RULE ON STOCK RETURNS     
 
The extant literature measures stock overvaluation by using the subsequent abnormal returns of various test 
portfolios (Diether et al., 2002 and Boehme et al., 2006). In this paper, I use the risk-adjusted return differential 
between low- and high- dispersion portfolios as a proxy for stock overvaluation. If overvaluation is caused by 
disagreement among investors when short sales are constrained, then portfolios consisting of high-dispersion stocks 
would yield lower risk-adjusted returns than the portfolio consisting of low-dispersion stocks in the presence of 
short sale constraints. Therefore, a smaller positive value of the return differential between low- and high-dispersion 
portfolios in the pilot stock sample than in the control stock sample would provide evidence in support of the null 
hypothesis, which states that high-dispersion stocks tend to be less overvalued relative to low-dispersion stocks in 
the pilot sample than in the control sample. Similarly, a non-significant value of the return differential between low- 
and high-dispersion stocks would support the alternative hypothesis which states that there is an ambiguous relation 
between short sale constraints and future stock returns.  
 
Following Boehme and Sorescu (2002) and Boehme et al. (2006), I adopt the standard calendar-time 
portfolio method to measure stock returns. Each day, I sort stocks into different categories based on the measure of 
investor opinion dispersion, then I hold an equally (or value) weighted portfolio for a specific holding period and 
calculate the cumulative portfolio holding period return. This process is repeated each day during the sample period, 
generating a series of observations of portfolio cumulative returns for each holding period. Then, the specific 
cumulative portfolio holding period return is computed as the simple average of previously generated portfolio 
holding period cumulative returns. To adjust for serial correlation, t-statistics are calculated based on the Newey-
West standard errors (estimator) with lags up to 20 days. Due to the data frequency limitation, previous literature 
measure portfolio returns by holding stocks for a period equal to or longer than one month. However, it is possible 
that the impact of short sale constraints will be reflected in stock prices sooner than one month. Previous studies 
using monthly short interest have been unable to investigate the short-term dynamics on how stock overvaluation is 
corrected as uncertainty resolves over time. In this paper, high frequency short sale data provide me with great 
flexibility in choosing the stock return holding period, and allow me to conduct a time dynamics analysis on how the 
market generates and corrects stock overvaluation as uncertainty raise and resolve as time goes on.  
 
To construct portfolios with holding periods ranging from one day to one year, I first sort both pilot and 
control stocks into thirds based on the measure of investors’ opinions dispersion. Then I hold an equally-weighted 
portfolio for a variety of periods ranging from one day to one year
5
. This process is repeated each day from May 2, 
2005 to Dec 30, 2005, so there is an overlap of 170 holding periods on the portfolio returns. Each portfolio return is 
the average of 170 different accumulative portfolio returns with holding periods in the same range as above. If 
lifting uptick rules relaxes short sale constraints and mitigates stock overvaluation, then the return differential 
between low and high dispersion portfolios will be less for pilot stocks than for control stocks. 
 
Table 2 presents the risk-adjusted return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios during the 
post-SHO period, for pilot and control samples on the both stock exchanges.  The risk-adjusted return differentials 
are denoted as (D1-D3) in Table 2, where D1 is the low-dispersion portfolio return and D3 is the high-dispersion 
portfolio return.  
                                                 
5 Equally-weighted portfolio returns are calculated and presented in this paper. Value-weighted portfolio returns are also 
calculated but nor reported because results based on value-weighted portfolio returns are essentially the same as the results based 
on equally-weighted portfolio returns.  
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Table 2. The risk-adjusted return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios during the post-SHO period 
   NYSE     NASDAQ  
HD Pilot t Control  t Diff t Pilot t Control  t Diff t 
 (1)  (2)  (2)-(1)  (3)  (4)  (4)-(3)  
1 0.03% 0.99 0.04% 1.15 0.01% 0.18 0.03% 0.24 0.04% 0.88 0.02% 0.14 
5 0.06% 0.94 0.19%** 2.20 0.13% 1.22 0.03% 0.16 0.11% 1.03 0.08% 0.32 
10 0.20%** 2.33 0.34%*** 2.71 0.14% 0.93 0.03% 0.10 0.31%** 1.93 0.28% 0.83 
20 0.49%*** 3.64 0.41%** 2.24 -0.07% -0.21 -0.20% -0.45 0.60%*** 2.70 0.80% 1.63 
30 0.43%*** 2.51 0.86%** 2.20 0.43% 0.99 -0.40% -0.77 1.00%*** 3.40 1.40%** 2.34 
40 0.56%*** 2.70 1.23%*** 2.62 0.67% 1.31 -0.68% -1.14 1.36%*** 4.20 2.04%*** 3.00 
50 0.72%*** 2.94 1.99%*** 3.64 1.27%** 2.11 -1.33%** -2.05 1.24%*** 3.95 2.57%*** 3.57 
60 0.93%*** 3.70 2.18%*** 3.11 1.25%** 1.98 -1.94%*** -2.90 1.22%*** 3.62 3.16%*** 4.22 
70 1.23%*** 5.26 2.83%*** 4.87 1.60%*** 2.56 -2.60%*** -3.94 1.21%*** 3.40 3.81%*** 5.08 
80 1.49%*** 7.82 3.28%*** 5.08 1.79%*** 2.66 -3.01%*** -4.66 1.16%*** 3.06 4.16%*** 5.57 
90 2.08%*** 7.76 3.93%*** 7.38 1.85%*** 3.10 -3.27%*** -5.25 1.04%*** 2.88 4.32%*** 5.99 
100 2.08%*** 11.34 4.11%*** 8.03 2.03%*** 3.73 -3.42%*** -5.78 0.97%*** 2.72 4.39%*** 6.35 
110 2.22%*** 11.81 4.37%*** 7.56 2.15%*** 3.53 -3.53%*** -5.67 1.05%*** 3.04 4.58%*** 6.43 
120 2.42%*** 12.26 4.97%*** 8.05 2.56%*** 3.94 -3.67%*** -5.62 1.16%*** 3.31 4.83%*** 6.52 
130 2.34%*** 12.01 4.53%*** 7.78 2.19%*** 3.56 -4.09%*** -5.97 0.97%*** 2.40 5.06%*** 6.36 
140 2.50%*** 12.05 5.02%*** 7.45 2.52%*** 3.57 -4.17%*** -5.79 1.02%*** 2.80 5.18%*** 6.43 
150 2.50%*** 11.39 4.88%*** 6.85 2.38%*** 3.20 -3.98%*** -5.21 1.06%*** 2.75 5.03%*** 5.89 
160 2.50%*** 10.86 4.71%*** 6.69 2.21%*** 2.98 -3.81%*** -4.73 1.44%*** 3.84 5.25%*** 5.91 
170 2.49%*** 9.34 5.16%*** 6.76 2.67%*** 3.30 -3.52%*** -3.97 1.74%*** 4.32 5.25%*** 5.40 
180 2.38%*** 8.99 5.00%*** 5.86 2.62%*** 2.93 -3.31%*** -3.53 2.18%*** 6.25 5.49%*** 5.49 
190 2.36%*** 8.93 5.49%*** 6.47 3.13%*** 3.52 -2.94%*** -2.98 2.30%*** 6.55 5.24%*** 5.00 
200 2.42%*** 8.52 4.96%*** 7.04 2.53%*** 3.34 -2.54%*** -2.49 2.54%*** 6.84 5.08%*** 4.67 
210 2.39%*** 8.17 5.11%*** 7.14 2.72%*** 3.52 -2.24%** -2.17 2.87%*** 7.89 5.11%*** 4.68 
220 2.26%*** 7.36 5.19%*** 6.51 2.93%*** 3.43 -1.81%** -1.73 3.22%*** 9.24 5.02%*** 4.55 
230 2.03%*** 6.71 3.89%*** 4.64 1.86%** 2.09 -1.44%* -1.39 3.42%*** 8.44 4.85%*** 4.37 
240 1.63%*** 5.13 5.13%*** 5.26 3.50%*** 3.42 -0.98% -1.01 3.59%*** 8.43 4.57%*** 4.29 
251 1.16%*** 3.45 3.21%*** 3.84 2.06%** 2.28 -0.14% -0.15 3.65%*** 7.95 3.79%*** 3.75 
The Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are presented following the mean estimations. HD represents holding period (in days). 
***,**, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
For NYSE-listed stock, Table 2 shows that the risk-adjusted return differentials between low- and high-
dispersion portfolios are significantly positive for holding periods greater than 10 trading days in both the pilot and 
control samples. This is consistent with Miller’s overpricing hypothesis, which states that high-dispersion stocks 
tend to be overvalued relative to low-dispersion stocks in the presence of both short sale constraints and investor 
opinion dispersion. More importantly, Table 2 shows that the risk-adjusted return differentials between the low- and 
high-dispersion portfolios are significantly greater in the control stocks than those in the pilot sample for holding 
periods that are greater than 50 trading days.  The return differential difference between the control and pilot 
samples increases with the portfolio holding period and reaches the highest level of 3.13% when the portfolios are 
held for 190 trading days, suggesting that the suspension of the uptick rule on the NYSE help to mitigate stock 
overvaluation up to about 3% in an one-year time period. This finding supports the null hypothesis that stock 
overvaluation are mitigated when the uptick rule is suspended on the NYSE during the post-SHO period. 
 
With regard to NASDAQ-listed stocks, results in Table 2 show a similar pattern of the return differentials 
between low- and high-dispersion portfolios for control stocks listed on the NASDAQ as for control stocks listed on 
the NYSE. However, instead of having a smaller positive return differential than control stocks, pilot stocks on the 
NASDAQ now have a significant negative return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios across 
most holding periods. This result indicates that when the bid-test was suspended on the NASDAQ during the pilot 
program, high-dispersion stock prices were depressed relative to low-dispersion stock prices. This leads to higher 
subsequent future returns for high-dispersion stocks than for low-dispersion stocks, or negative low- and high-
dispersion portfolio return differentials.  In particular, high-dispersion pilot stocks subsequently out-perform low-
dispersion pilot stocks by as much as 5.5% of the stock value over a one year period. 
 
To show how stock overvaluation are generated and corrected by the market as uncertainty raise and 
resolve as time goes on in a one-year period, I plot risk-adjusted return differential between low-and high-dispersion 
portfolios, (D1-D3), for holding periods ranging from one day to one year for both pilot and control samples in 
Figure 1 and 2 for NYSE and NASDAQ-listed stocks, respectively.  
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Figure 1. Cumulative Holding Period Risk Adjusted Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios during the post-SHO Period for NYSE listed Stocks 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Holding Period Risk Adjusted Return Differential between Low- and 
High-Dispersion Portfolios during the post-SHO Period for NASDAQ Listed Stocks 
 
Figure1 displays the time path of stock overvaluation for pilot and control stocks on the NYSE during the 
post-SHO period. It reveals two important patterns. First, the return differential between low- and high-dispersion 
portfolios in the control sample is generally greater than in the pilot sample across virtually all holding periods, 
supporting the null hypothesis that the suspension of the uptick rule helps to mitigate stock overvaluation. Second, 
the return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios in the pilot sample diminishes, but never reach 
zero over a one-year time period. This is a reasonable, because while the uptick rule was suspended for pilot stocks, 
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other short sale constraints still existed, preventing the market from fully correcting all the overvaluation. Another 
possible explanation is that firms’ earnings uncertainty will not diminish to zero over time, because as the 
uncertainty in the most recent quarter’s earning resolves with time, the uncertainty in the forthcoming quarter’s 
earnings emerges.  
 
Figure 2 shows that , on the NASDAQ, the market corrects overvaluation in high-dispersion pilot stocks 
quickly in a very short time period, then it goes further to depress high-dispersion pilot stock prices. Such negative 
return differential eventually diminishes to zero over a longer period. The surprising results here suggest that 
removing the uptick rule restriction on the NASDAQ goes beyond mitigating overvaluation in high-dispersion 
stocks; it leads to depressed prices for these stocks. With no uptick rule restriction, investors who hold more 
pessimistic opinions can short sell stocks at a price that may be lower than the true stock value. Also, the suspension 
of the uptick rule makes it easier for predatory short sellers to aggressively submit short orders and manipulate stock 
prices downwards
6
. Therefore, the results here suggest that we cannot rule out the possibility that removing the 
uptick rule on the NASDAQ makes it easier for “predatory” short sellers to manipulate stock prices downward. 
According to Reuters News August 9, 2007, "The hedge funds were very, very aware of this (the removal of the 
uptick rule). They sit around and giggle when this stuff happens," said Mallory Hill, chief executive of mortgage 
lender Novelle Financial Services. "Without the uptick rule, they can put anyone out of business." Further, Mortgage 
lenders, battered by the subprime lending crisis, are particularly worried that removing short sale restrictions has 
contributed to their sector's troubles. These media reports highlighted concerns that the uptick rule may be effective 
in preventing short sellers from manipulating prices downwards and suggested that removing the uptick rule may 
not be considered as an optimal policy.  
 
5.  ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
5.1.  Fama-French four-factor time series regressions 
 
The risk-adjusted portfolio return differential between the control and pilot sample may be caused by firm-
specific characteristics such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum factors. The pilot and control sample 
matching procedure performed in this paper should have addressed this issue. To further ensure the effects of the 
suspension of the uptick rule on stock returns are not caused by other systematic differences between the pilot and 
control stocks, I adopt the following a four-factor time series regression method suggested by Fama-French (1996) 
and Carhart (1997).  
 
pttptptpftmtppftpt UMDuHMLhSMBsRRRR   )(                      (4) 
 
where )( ftmt RR  , is the excess return (portfolio return minus the one-month Treasury bill rate) on the value-
weighted market portfolio, SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on 
a portfolio of large stocks, and HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio consisted of high book-to-
market stocks and the return on a portfolio comprised of low book-to-market stocks. The variable HML represents 
the value premium and the variable SMB represents the size premium. To capture the momentum factor, I include 
the variable UMD, the return difference between a portfolio comprised of stock with high return from month t-12 to 
month t-2 and a portfolio consisted of stocks with low return from month t-12 to month t-2. 
 
In such regressions, a well-specified asset pricing model produces intercepts that are indistinguishable from 
zero and the estimated intercepts provide a simple return metric and a formal test of how well different combinations 
of the common factors capture the cross section of average return (Fama and French, 1996). If high-dispersion 
stocks earn lower returns than low-dispersion stocks due to the short sale constraints, then time-series portfolio of 
high (low) dispersion stocks should be associated with lower (higher) returns relative to an explicit asset pricing 
                                                 
6 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) define predatory short selling as the trading that induces and/or exploits the need of other 
investors to reduce their positions. If one or a group of traders needs to sell, others may also engage in selling (or short selling) 
and then cover their positions for a profit by buying the stock at a lower price. 
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model
7
. 
 
Next, I run four-factor Fama-French time series regressions on low-, medium-, and high-dispersion 
portfolios separately for both the pilot and control samples
8
.  Each regression covers the period from May 02 to Dec 
30, 2005 with a total of 170 time-series observations. The holding period dynamic analysis requires me to repeat the 
regressions for various holding periods ranging from one day to 251 days. Therefore, for portfolios with holding 
periods greater than one day, I need to include stock returns data from 2006. For example, for portfolios with a 
holding period of 251 days, the first observation in the time series is the return of a one year period from May 2, 
2005 to May 2, 2006, and the last observation in the time series is the return of a one year period from December 31, 
2005 to December 31, 2006. So there are 251 regressions for each dispersion stock portfolio, resulting in a total of 
753 of regressions for either the pilot or control sample. I report in Table 3 the intercept estimates in those 
regressions for low-, medium-, and high-dispersion portfolios with a variety holding periods. 
 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the estimates of the intercepts in four-factor time-series regressions for NYSE-
listed stocks. The estimated intercepts for the control sample indicate that the four-factor model leaves an 
unexplained large negative return for the high-dispersion portfolio and an unexplained large positive return for the 
low-dispersion portfolio. This is consistent with the regression results in Diether et al. (2002). In contrast, for pilot 
stocks, high-dispersion portfolios did not systematically produce unexplained negative intercepts, and low-
dispersion portfolios rarely showed unexplained positive intercepts, indicating that the four-factor asset pricing 
model does a better job in capturing expected stock returns based on common risk factors for pilot stocks than for 
control stocks. It also shows that for pilot stocks, the unexplained intercepts, periodically but not predominately 
demonstrate significance for certain holding periods, suggesting that the overvaluation anomaly in pilot stocks has 
not been completely eliminated. This is consistent with previous results and the fact that the uptick rule is not the 
only short sale constraint that prevents short sellers from projecting their negative opinions into stock prices. In 
essence, the regression results suggest that after controlling for firm size, book-to-market, and momentum factors, 
the stock overvaluation anomaly existing in the control stocks has been mitigated in the pilot stocks on the NYSE. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the intercept estimates in four-factor time-series regressions for NASDAQ-listed stocks. 
For the NASDAQ-control sample, consistent with the results in the NYSE, the four-factor model leaves unexplained 
negative intercepts for high-dispersion portfolios and unexplained positive intercepts for low-dispersion portfolios. 
For the NASDAQ-pilot sample, however, the results show that the undervaluation of high-dispersion stocks relative 
to low-dispersion stocks is caused by either the negative deviation of high-dispersion stock values from the fair 
valuation reflected in the four-factor model or the positive deviation of low-dispersion stock values relative to the 
fair valuation in the model.  
 
Table 3. Time Series Tests of Four-factor Models for Dispersion Thirds during the Post-SHO Period 
Panel A. NYSE-listed stocks 
Holding  Pilot Sample    Control Sample  
Period D1 D2 D3  D1 D2 D3 
1 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002  0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002* 
 (0.98) (-1.80) (-0.95)  (0.99) (1.27) (-1.76) 
10 0.0008* -0.0016 -0.0005  0.0013*** 0.0005 -0.0023*** 
 (1.80) (-1.70) (-1.03)  (2.88) (0.96) (-3.72) 
20 0.0013 -0.0046*** -0.0010  0.0034*** -0.0008 -0.0047*** 
 (1.21) (-3.01) (-1.17)  (3.75) (-0.54) (-2.67) 
30 -0.0017 -0.0045** -0.0039***  0.0058*** -0.0027 -0.0079* 
 (-0.95) (-2.36) (-2.89)  (5.23) (-1.36) (-1.77) 
60 0.0070 -0.0073 0.0119***  0.0209*** -0.0074 0.0088 
 (1.37) (-1.02) (2.70)  (8.40) (-1.36) (0.89) 
120 0.0174*** -0.0020 -0.0056  0.0201*** -0.0083 -0.0307** 
 (3.53) (-0.16) (-1.21)  (6.46) (-1.26) (-2.26) 
180 0.0397*** 0.0173 0.0099  0.0293*** -0.0043 -0.0540*** 
 (3.33) (0.81) (1.19)  (3.29) (-0.45) (-5.18) 
251 0.0293 -0.0206 -0.0762***  0.0202* 0.0260 -0.1522*** 
 (1.67) (-0.52) -5.14  1.81 (1.92) (-11.6) 
                                                 
7 While the intercept in the regressions appears to be similar to Jensen’s alpha in the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), I do not interpret it as a measure of portfolio performance attribution.  
8 In addition, I run Fama-French three-factor model regressions, which produce essentially similar results as those in Table 3. 
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Panel B. NASDAQ-listed stocks 
Holding  Pilot Sample    Control Sample  
Period D1 D2 D3  D1 D2 D3 
1 -0.002 0.01% 0.005***  0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.21) (0.36) (2.70)  (3.38) (-0.47) (-0.49) 
10 -0.002 0.0007% 0.00%  0.005*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.21) (-0.05) (0.02)  (4.83) (-0.03) (-1.11) 
20 -0.003 -0.001 0.17%  0.008*** 0.002 -0.004** 
 (-0.83) (-0.34) (0.71)  (5.21) (1.11) (-2.07) 
30 -0.008*** 0.002 0.18%  0.014*** 0.005 -0.007** 
 (-4.66) (0.08) (0.84)  (9.02) (1.26) (-2.45) 
60 -0.014*** -0.005 0.004**  0.023*** 0.007* -0.008** 
 (-4.75) (-1.39) (2.06)  (10.24) (1.75) (-2.46) 
120 -0.011 0.009 0.060**  0.033*** 0.017 0.020** 
 (-1.07) (0.57) (2.50)  (5.12) (1.60) (2.27) 
180 0.007 -0.031 0.030  0.009 0.002 0.040* 
 (0.24) (-1.17) (0.91)  (1.32) (0.39) (1.75) 
251 -0.015*** -1.00% 0.031  -0.004 0.009 0.049 
 (-4.41) (-0.30) (0.32)  (-0.27) (0.63) (1.47) 
Holding periods are in days. The sample period is from May 02, 2005 through Dec 30, 2005. The dispersion equal-weighted thirds are formed as 
in Table 4. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **,* are significant  at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5.2  Controlling for availability of exchange-traded-options  
 
Since stock options provide pessimists with an alternative vehicle to speculate on their negative private 
information, short sale constraints will be mitigated by their presence. Stocks with options will be less overvalued 
(or depressed) than those without (Danielsen and Sorescu, 2001). Therefore, for stocks with options, it is reasonable 
to expect that the effect of the suspension of short sale price tests in mitigating stock overvaluation would be minor. 
I address this issue and control for the effect of stock option availability by separating stocks with exchange-traded-
options from those with no exchange-traded-options. Table 4 presents the risk adjusted return differentials between 
low- and high-dispersion portfolios for stocks with options and stocks with no options.  
 
Table 4 shows that on both the NYSE and NASDAQ, for stocks with no option, the effect of suspending 
the uptick rule in mitigating overvaluation is profound in stocks with no exchanged-traded-options. For stocks with 
exchange-traded-options, such effect is not statistically significant across all holding periods. This result is 
consistent with that the effect of reducing high-dispersion stock overvaluation by the suspension of the uptick rule is 
not significant for stocks with options, because as an alternative to short, exchange traded options helped to reduce 
the overvaluation in pilot stocks before the suspension of the uptick rule takes effect. This is consistent with 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) and highlights the role of stock option as an alternative of short selling vehicle in 
reducing stock overvaluation. The implication here is that in order to mitigate stock overvaluation and to improve 
stock price efficiency, introducing stock options can be a substitute of removing the uptick rule.         
 
Table 4. The risk adjusted cumulative return differential between low- and high-dispersion portfolios for pilot and control samples 
during the post-SHO period: controlling for exchange traded option availabilities 
Panel A. NYSE-listed stocks 
Holding 
 
Stocks with no options 
   
Stocks with options 
  Period Pilot t Control t Diff t Pilot t Control t Diff t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(2)-(1) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(4)-(3) 
 1 day 0.02% 0.53 0.04% 0.92 0.02% 0.34 0.03% 1.18 0.03% 1.00 0.00% -0.08 
1 week -0.02% -0.28 0.20% 2.07 0.23% 1.80 0.14% 2.14 0.19% 2.23 0.05% 0.47 
1 month 0.21% 1.52 0.60% 2.47 0.39% 1.39 0.66% 4.51 0.34% 0.69 -0.32% -0.62 
3 months 0.19% 0.90 2.21% 5.19 2.02%*** 4.24 1.79% 5.96 2.45% 3.62 0.65% 0.88 
6 months 1.71% 9.57 4.89% 9.23 3.19%*** 5.70 3.19% 11.89 4.12% 6.63 0.93% 1.37 
9 months 1.30% 6.38 4.65% 8.22 3.35%*** 5.57 3.89% 9.65 4.08% 5.33 0.19% 0.22 
12 months -0.12% -0.41 3.37% 4.68 3.49%*** 4.50 3.35% 7.66 2.79% 4.00 -0.57% -0.69 
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Panel B. NASDAQ-listed stocks 
Holding 
 
Stocks with no options 
   
Stocks with options 
  Period Pilot t Control t Diff t Pilot t Control t Diff t 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(2)-(1) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(4)-(3) 
 1 day 0.08% 1.47 0.05% 0.78 -0.03% -0.36 0.02% 0.46 0.00% 0.12 -0.02% -0.46 
1 week 0.28% 2.49 0.25% 2.22 -0.03% -0.19 0.09% 0.92 0.06% 0.62 -0.03% -0.22 
1 month 0.66% 2.78 0.75% 3.34 0.09% 0.28 0.01% 0.04 0.67% 2.84 0.66%** 1.92 
3 months 0.68% 2.01 1.85% 5.45 1.17%*** 2.44 -0.69% -2.39 1.17% 3.25 1.86%*** 4.03 
6 months -0.26% -0.64 2.17% 4.84 2.43%*** 4.02 -1.15% -3.17 0.95% 2.52 2.10%*** 4.01 
9 months -1.41% -5.77 3.47% 11.2 4.88%*** 12.4 0.71% 1.63 1.36% 2.24 0.65% 0.87 
12 months 1.56% 5.64 5.60% 13.85 4.04%*** 8.25 0.91% 2.17 1.13% 1.87 0.22% 0.3 
Newey-West adjusted t-statistics are reported with the mean estimations. Diff is defined as the difference between the control sample and the 
pilot sample. ***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The recently adopted SHO Regulation provided us with a natural experiment to study if the uptick rule 
inflates stock prices in a controlled environment. In this paper, I used Regulation SHO data from 2005 to examine 
whether the suspension of uptick rules mitigates stock overvaluation  by comparing stocks with less short sale 
constraints (pilot stocks) and stocks with more short sale constraints (control stocks). The results show that the 
suspension of the uptick rule mitigated stock overvaluation on the NYSE during the sample period from May to 
December 2005. In particular, the comparison based on the matched pilot and control samples shows that the 
suspension of uptick rules on the NYSE can mitigate stock overvaluation as much as 3% of the stock value in a one 
year period. This results is consistent with Miller (1977)’s overpricing hypothesis, which argue that stock 
overvaluation is associated with the presence of high investors’ opinion dispersion and more short sale constraints. 
On the NASDAQ, however, the lifting of the uptick rule went beyond correcting stock overvaluation. Prices of high-
dispersion stocks tended to be depressed relative to prices of low-dispersion stocks when the uptick rule was 
suspended. The results here also suggest that the SEC’s decision to revoke the uptick rule restriction may not be 
considered as an optimal policy, if such undervaluation is driven by ‘predatory’ short sellers’ price manipulations. 
Results are robust when I control for firm size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum factors. For stocks with 
exchange-traded -options, it appears that the suspension of uptick rules cannot effectively help to reduce the 
overvaluation since overvaluation in those stocks has already been mitigated by the introduction of options, 
suggesting that in order to mitigate stock overvaluation and to improve stock price efficiency introducing stock 
options can be a substitute of removing uptick rules.  
 
The results in this paper generate several interesting questions for future research. First, why are the effects 
of removing the short sale price tests on stock returns so different for the NYSE and the NASDAQ? Is this caused 
by different market microstructures, such as trading liquidity and trading costs, or other unknown forces? Second, it 
would be a promising extension to establish a direct link between predatory short sellers’ price manipulation and the 
undervaluation in the NASDAQ pilot stocks. Finally, taking a closer look at how the suspension of the short sale 
price tests and intra-day stock returns by using intra-day short selling data would improve our understanding of how 
the suspension of the short sale price tests help improve stock price efficiency, a key issue that is of interest to both 
regulators and investors.  
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